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The Derrida-Marion Debate: Language Again, to einpllasize that he is not talking about some object in 
and Mystical Theology the world, or even within language, of which certain definable 
attributes may be predicated, he says, "I would say, first off, that 
Charles Matthew Stapleton diffdrance, which is neither a word nor a concept, strategically 
University of Memphis to me the most proper one to think, if not to rna~ter."~ 
As exemplified in the passages just cited, Derrida employs 
Early in his career, during the winter of 1968, Jacques Derrida, language in a way not unlike the mystical theology of the three 
writing in an essay entitled Dgkrance, reminds us that there is Abrahamic traditions: Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. This fact 
no purely phonetic writing. Rather, unlike how we tend to think will be critical for our investigation. Let us look at two similarities 
of speaking, writing is surrounded on all sides by what it is not, between Derrida's quasi-concept diffdrance and how the God of 
and by silence. This claim, that writing is never purely phonetic Abraham is envisioned within the three traditions. 
writing, and its companion assertion that the differing-deferring First, both diffdrance and God as such, cannot be 
dynamic, known as diffdrance, is at play in writing, is meant as a encountered in the present; their arrival on the scene is always 
critique against the metaphysics of presence. As Jean-Luc Marion deferred. Yahweh warns Moses saying, "My face . . . you cannot 
notes, although the phrase "metaphysics is a term only see, for no human being can see me and survive," and John tells us 
loosely defined, and absent from Heidegger's corpus altogether, "No one has ever seen God."4 Likewise, Derrida says, 
we are able to give a brief sketch of what is meant by it.' More or "The trace (of that) which can never be presented, the 
less, the metaphysics of presence is the ideology that the world can trace which itself can never be presented: that is, appear 
be rigidly divided into subjectlobject relations, and that the world and manifest itself, as such, in its phenomenon . . . Always 
is constituted of stable objects of which attributes are predicated. differing and deferring, the trace is never as it is in the 
Said differently, because time serves as the horizon by which being presentation of itself. It erases itself in presenting itself, 
is defined, and in turn beings, the prioritization of the present within muffles itself in resonating, like the writing itself, inscribing 
the histoly of nletaphysics has led to erroneous understandings of its pyramid in diffd~ance."~ 
the phenomenon of experience. In order for Derrida to not fall into 
the same pitfall as the tradition that he is critiquing, or as he likes to TO think diffdrance or God within the present, thus subordinating 
call it, deconstructing, he must deny that diffkrance itself is presellt then1 within being, is to attempt to otherness while 
within writing. asking how we lnay speak from out ofdiff6rance tiying to include them in the categoly of the same, which is exactly 
without predicating existence to it, he offers the following: 1 what cannot be done. The n~ysterious God hidden in the buniing 
It goes without saying that [the a of diffdrance] cannot I bush, speaking silently in the wind, whose ways are unknowable 
be exposed. One can expose only that which at a certain cannot be encountered as, noting that everything turns on the "as", 
moment can become present, manifest, that which can be knowable and un-mysterious. 
shown, presented as something present, a being-present With that said, a word of caution needs to be extended. 
in its truth, in the truth of a present or the presence of the The absence of God and diffdrance can easily be thought of as a 
present. N~~ ifdiffdrance (and I also cross out the akfl) modification of the present. When it is said that God or diffdrance 
what makes possible the presentatioil of the being-present, are not Present, or do not appear on the horizon of experience, 
it is never presented as such. It is never offered to the it is not simultaneously conceded that God or diffdrance could 
present.' , at some future moment come to the fore. As Derrida has it, one 
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misunderstanding of negative theology, one that led him to detach 
deconstruction from conflation with negative theology, is that it 
holds within its practices a secret to which only the elect have 
access. If this were true the secret could potentially be given public 
access and reveal itself in the present. Howevel; the possibility 
that God or diffdrance could become present is precisely the 
misunderstanding that needs to be avoided. 
Second, diffkrance and God are otherwise than the 
existence for which they provide the possibility. Diffkrance within 
deconstruction and God within the Abrahainic traditions provide for 
something like the possibility in which beings can appear, or present 
themselves. Given this, to predicate presence or existence of God 
or diffdrance would not make sense. As a circle cannot both delimit 
the enclosed space encapsulated within it and dwell within that 
space, neither can God nor differaxe present theinselves within the 
present for which they create the possibility. 
Given these similarities, and others, a number of questions 
are raised. Is diffdrance, according to Derrida, or otherwise, 
the same as God? Is Derrida, a philosopher who quite rightly 
passes as an atheist, engaging himself in the discourse of mystical 
theology'? If the answer to the first two questions is "no," then does 
deconstruction find a rival in mystical theology? With that questioll 
in mind, it should be noted that mystical theology as understood by 
Marion, Dionysius, and, as I will argue, Derrida encapsulates the 
three movements of affirmation, privation, and performance, and not 
merely one of them, as for example, negative t h e ~ l o g y . ~  Returning 
to the essay Difzrance, the answers to two of the three questions 
can be found easily enough. He, Derrida, states early in this essay 
that: 
. . .The detours, locutions, and syntax in which 1 will 
often have to take recourse will resemble those of 
negative theology, occasionally even to the point of being 
indistinguishable fi-oin negative theology. Already we have 
had to delineate that difJErance is not, does not exist, is 
not a present-being (on) in any fom-nl; and we will be led to 
delineate also everything that it is not, that is, everything; 
and consequently that it has neither existence nor essence. 
It derives from no category of being whether present or 
absent.' 
From Derrida's point of view, the language of mystical 
thcology and the language employed in designating what diffkrance 
is-not are similar. However, diffkrance is not a supreme being. 
Later he notes, "This unnamable is not an ineffable Being, which 
no name could approach: God, for example." Again, he says, 
"It is not a present being, however excellent, unique, principal, 
or transcendent. It governs nothing, rcigns over nothing, and 
nowhere exercises any autl~ority."~ Neither existence nor essence 
can be predicated of diffkrance, therefore it is in~possible according 
to Derrida's own rules for understanding diffdrance to say that it 
I is anything, much less God. Furthermore, it is his claim that the 
nlanner in which mystical theology has chosen to speak of God, as 
opposed to deconstruction's non-predicative manner of speaking 
from diffdrance, is victim to the metaphysics of presence, and 
ends with an understanding of God subordinated to beingg It is 
this claim, made by Derrida-that mystical theology, specifically 
negative theology, while denying the predicate of existence to 
God, ultimately gives way to positive theology, and posits that God 
does exist, however, in a higher, more-elevated, hyperessential 
mode of being-which Jean-Luc Marion contests. Conversely, 
Marion claiins that the language of mystical theology, far from 
being chained to the bondages of the metaphysics of presence, has 
a performative aspect, to which he accuses Derrida of not giving 
credence, that does not merely state what God is or is not. Rather, 
the performative aspect of mystical theology, according to Marion, 
I engages itself with, or is engaged by, the divine instead of merely 
speaking about God. 
I 
Arthur Bradley notes, "It is c~ucially important to put 
' Marion's argument into the philosophical context of the debate 
between metaphysics and theology. He takes as his starting point 
a critique 01 the role and status of metaphysics vis-a-vis traditional 
I Christian theology."'O As envisaged in the works of Thomas 
I Aquinas, Leibniz, and Descartes, theology and metaphysics 
1 attempted, according to Marion, to join forces not only to establish 
I a firm foundational trulli on which to build a philosophical system, 
I but also to delve into the infinite recesses of the essence and 
1 existence of God. Today, he thinks, it is fairly obvious that these 
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attempts were futile, and instead of being convincing only fuel the 
flames of atheistic arguments. All the arguments for the existence 
of God whether the argument from design, the ontological 
argument, the argument from experience, or the first cause 
argument fall under the heading of onto-theology. Taking his lead 
from Heidegger, Marion is wont to argue that onto-theology was a 
misstep on the part of Scholastic philosophers and theologians. 
The following is one reason why from Marion's stance, 
and in general, that all arguments of the onto-theological sort are 
inappropriate for mystical theology. The meaning of the verb "to 
be" is taken for granted. That is, almost no one questions what it 
means for something "to be" or for something to exist. We use the 
verb "to be," and very often, it is merely implied, without a thought 
about its inlplications. Many things exist within our world: cars, 
other people, animals, houses, etc. In general, we refer to these 
as things, entities, or beings, that is, without the implication that 
beings in this generic sense are alive. Therefore, it is necessary 
that a distinction be made between the beings that dwell within 
the world, and the world all these beings share. This world, this 
totality of relations and references, has traditionally been referred to 
as being. All things, cars, people and houses included, are because 
they are caught up in the nexus of being, or take part in being. 
By saying that things are, we predicate of those things existence; 
we say they exist. However, being within this constnlction is 
primordially first. Beings are subordinated under being, are given 
their origin in being. Nonetheless, being should not be understood 
as a being among other beings, a supreme being before all others, 
or merely the sum total of all such beings. Therefore, if it is said 
of God that God exists, or even God "is," then God within this 
mental constnlction, the one onto-theology adopts, is subordinated 
under being. Since by definition God cannot be subordinated 
under anything else, God as understood in the onto-theological 
framework, as merely another being among others, is less than 
God. As Heidegger is more economical in stating the same, I will 
quote him at length: 
I believe that Being can never be thought as the ground 
or essence of God, but that nevertheless the experience of 
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God and of his manifestedness, to the extent that the later 
can indeed meet man, flashes in the dimension of Being, 
which in no way signifies that Being might be regarded as a 
possible predicate for God." 
The failure of onto-theology was not left unnoticed by 
all theologians. Neither was the way of predication, the way of 
affirmation, or as it is more commonly known, positive theology, 
thought of as the path through an apparent impasse. Whereas 
positive theology or onto-theology attempted to predicate certain 
attributes of God only to the detriment of the conceptualization of 
God, negative theology sought to show God's supreme eminence 
by way of saying what God is not. God, according to this path, 
is not of this world, is not mortal, is not human, is not being, and 
is not grounded in being. God is nothing: God is not a thing in 
the world. However, as will be shown, negative theology also 
predicates existence of God and thus subsumes the power of 
God under being. As we have been saying, there are at least two 
circuitous movements within mystical theology, the positive and 
the negative. Though each as we have been describing them 
appears distinct from the other, in that one predicates of God certain 
attributes, and the other denies the predicates, negative theology is 
reliant on the metaphysics of presknce or positive theology for its 
ability to deny the predicates. To deny the factuality of a statement, 
logically that statement must first be made. Therefore, the radical 
' nay-saying of negative theology also falls within the yes-saying of 
I traditional metaphysics. Derrida says in an essay entitled How to 
I Avoid Speaking that: 
[The economy of mystical theology] is paradoxical. In 
principle, the apophatic movement of discourse would have 
to negatively retraverse all the stages of symbolic theology 
l and positive predication. It would thus be coextensive 
with it, confined to the same quantity of discourse. In 
I itself interminable, the apophatic movement cannot contain within itself the principle of its interruption. It can only 
indefinitely defer the encounter with its own 1imit.l2 
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For Dessida and Marion, this turn of events-that negative Dionysius states very clearly that every attribute is 
theology is just as suspect as positive theology in that it falls victim ~redicated of God, then, realizing that God is otherwise than what 
'0 the m e t a ~ h ~ s i c s  of ~resence,  and s"bsumes the essence of God world is, mystical theology denies was initially afimled. 
under being, and more correctly predicates an essence of God at He also intimates that there is another way, which is otherwise 
all-is problematic. Denigrating the value of negative theology, than every negation and affimlation. For our purposes, we will 
Dessida says, 
I understand the positive way and the negative way of mystical 
". . .negative theologies. . .are always interested with theology as having true and false values. That is, both these ways 
disengaging a su~eresselltialit~ the finite categories of speaking to say about what is true or not true 
of essence and existence, that is, of presence, and always about God through a propositional statement. The third way, then, 
hastening to recall that God is refused the predicate of we may surmise, does not take into consideration the categories of 
existence, only in order to acknowledge his superior, 
I true and false. 
inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being."13 , Accordingly, Marion says that the advantage of the "third 
way" is that it "is played out beyond the oppositions between 
According Del~ida, negative at first den~illg afilmatjon and negation, synthesis and separatioll, in  short 
existence and essence to the deity, in a reversal of predications, between the t i l e  and false." Continuing down the page, "The third 
actually asserts that God exists hyperessentially. way does not hide an affirmation beneath a negation, because it 
Both Dessida and Marion would insist that mystical means to overcome their duel, just as it means to overcome that 
theology has two movements at play within it-the positive and between the two truth values wherein metaphysics plays itself 
the negative. However, Marion goes further claiming also a third out.,,lwiven the advantage of the third way-that it  ovemolnes 
movement within mystical theology that overcomes the problems the problem of sllbordinating God under being-and given that 
of the previous two. What is more, Marion criticizes Dessida Marion believes that deconstruction knowingly ignores the third 
for not taking note of the third way. Marion says the task of his way in order to gain an advantage over mystical theology, it is 
critique is to assess the advantage that "the deconstruction of so- ' surprising that while responding to Marion, at a conference held at 
negative from its of Villanova in 1997, Denida that withill his texts there is 
the threefold character of ways." "ln short," he asks, "what end is to be found the third way of which Marion speaks. Desrida says of 
served, for Dessida, in denying the third way sticking with his texts, "They have a pragmatic aspect, a perfonnative aspect that 
a straightforward opposition between affirmation and negation?"14 would require another kind of analysis" other than that to which 
If the first two are the Positive and the negative positive and negative predications are subjected-nalne]y, the test 
way respectively, then the third might be called the way of excess of truthfulness. l 7  
or of saturated phenomena. Seeing that the debate between the two Marion in concert with Desrida also refers to the third way 
scholars revolves around an interpretation of the writer and mystic as utilizing the pragmatic or perforlnative function of language.lx 
DiOn~sius  the AreOpagite One particularly succinct passage be The first two ways, the positive and the negative, predicate of God 
cited. In the Divine Names, Dionysius writes: 1 some attribute or another; they seek to speak of or about God's 
It is necessary at first to impose and affirm all theses of , essence. However, the third way seeks to show God as beyond 
beings insofar as it is the cause of all, then deny them even I or othenvise than being. Dionysius uses the tesnl hyperousios, or 
more as it sL1rPasses let us not lnerely the prefix hyper to designate that, as opposed to the positive 
that the affirmations are the of the negations, since and negative ways, the third way speaks to God as than 
the cause which is above every negation as well as every 
position is still more above every privation.15 
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being. As Marion says, "Dionysius indicates this new pragmatic 
function of language, aiming at He who surpasses all nomination 
by giving him the title aitia-not the metaphysical "cause", but 
what all those who demand demand when they aim at Him from 
whom they come and to whom they retum."lg 
Two characteristics need to be noted about the third way. 
First, it directs itself to, is on its way to, points itself toward, that 
which is otherwise than being, or beyond being. Therefore, and 
secondly, we may tenuously say the third way no longer aims at 
talking about or ofGod, but to God. For this reason, it would 
seem that the third way, would suspend all communication with 
the world at a true and false level. Marion defends the third way 
against the reproach that it cannot express itself in propositional 
statements, or statements of fact, by asking: 
For if it is exact to say that we cannot think beyond Being.. . 
must this be held as a reproach against n~ystical theology 
and its third way? Should mystical theology be reproached 
for not knowing how to say, for not knowing or not wanting 
to say to us what this otherwise than being is all about-but 
doesn't this reproach at once seem a bit absurd?20 
Although I agree that the reproach that mystical theology 
cannot conform its manner of speaking-the perfomlative 
speech act-to either the positive or negative modes of speech is 
absurd, I believe by Marion's own reasoning his argument against 
Derrida-that he does not include a third way in his texts-also 
is absurd. Should Derrida be reproached for not knowing how to 
say, for not knowing or not wanting to say to us what this third 
way is all about? How would this third way as practiced, and not 
as conceptualized be expressed? Within the context of theology it 
is often in the form of praise and prayer, is it not? The praise act 
contains a mode of speech that does not merely state a fact, a truth, 
or a falsehood; it performs the very act it indicates. Following 
the argument of J.L. Austin, praise and prayer are cases "in which 
to say something is to do something; or in which by saying or in 
saying something we are doing ~omething."~~ When a worshipper 
says, "Praise be to God," or "Baruch hashem Adonai," within the 
context of praise, the very words constitute the praise act, or at 
least part of it." What the worshipper does not do is to announce 
the event of praise as such. It is considered inappropriate to the 
context of praise to say "I will praise Yahweh now.. ." or "Here 
is my praise to God.. ." Neither is the way of worship suited by a 
mere description of the matter of fact events, nor statements about 
the truth or falsehood of the act. Somehow, to do so, reduces the 
experience of worship, makes it less than it is. To know, in the 
know-how sense of the word know, what-worship-is is to be caught 
up in the worship, to make the ~novements of worship (or, in 
cmcel-t with Kierkegaard, the movements of faith) with sincerity of 
heart.23 In merely speaking about worship, one has not worshipped 
as such, but only uttered words about the date, the place, the words 
said, and so on. To know this third way, is to do the third way, or 
the act of praise. 
Considering this, can Derrida be blamed if he never 
mentions the third way explicitly? Might one reason for 
Marion's rash critique of Derrida be that he has not recognized 
the performative aspect of language at play, at work, because he 
only knows how to characterize the third way by what it is and is 
not, falling back, however much he may not want to, on the old 
metaphysical divisions of hue and false? 
With some hesitation, it wsis said that the act of praise or 
prayer escapes the dilemma of the metaphysics of presence by 
avoiding predicative language. Thus, in praising and praying one 
speaks to God, as opposed to speaking about or qf God. However, 
understood in this manner, praise and prayer are intentional acts 
not unlike having a conversation. When having a conversation one 
usually converses with someone, even if that someone is the self. 
Therefore, is it not the case that by saying that praise and prayer 
speak to God, one assumes that God is someone who can be spoken 
to? Yes it is. Being a someone requires being present, being alive, 
I existence. These attributes - presence and existence - are the 
attributes that cannot be predicated of God if the conceptualization 
of God is not to be diminished. Tn light of these considerations, it 
appears the original thesis that prayer and praise speak to God, as 
opposed to speaking about or of God, is problematic. 
14 Kinesis 
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Apart from any other criticisms that can be advanced against 
him, Marion is most unique in addressing this problem. When 
naming, he notes, the thing named is inscribed or delimited by the 
name. In the case of God, the name cannot perform this function 
without accruing the problems of the inetapl~ysics of presence. To 
delimit God by a name is to determine the undeterminable or to 
say that God exists. Nonetheless, Marion, drawing on Saint Paul's 
words in Philippians 2.9, argues that God's name is "the name 
which is above all other  name^."'^ The name above every name 
does not function in a fashion similar to the everyday names car, 
animal, tree, and house. Rather, the name of God inscribes God's 
adherents within the name, and accordingly, names them, speaking 
new existence into them. From this new perspective, prayer and 
praise do not so much speak to God, as they speak from God. 
Put differently, God speaks his children out of the silence, 
the clearing, or the impossible. This echoes the sentiment of 
Eckhart's that we are all words of God and Heidegger's that it is 
not we that speak language, but language that speaks us.'j Yet 
again, Saint Paul suggests that when, through some lack on our 
part, we are unable to pray, prayer originates with God the Spirit. 
He says: 
The Spirit too comes to help us in our weakness, for, when 
we do not know how to pray properly, then the Spirit 
personally makes our petitions for us in groans that cannot 
be put into words; and he who can see into all hearts knows 
what the Spirit means because the prayers that the Spirit 
makes for God's holy people are always in accordance with 
the mind of God.26 
Coming to the ends of language, the supplicant submits herself 
to God. God, in an experience that could only be described as 
excessive, intercedes for and through the supplicant. The prophets 
knew this experience well. Yahweh, for instance, touches the lips 
of Jeremiah and announces, "There! I have put my words into 
same movement of excess - the third way, which is undeterminable 
by statements of fact -that is operative in Derrida's texts as wcll. 
Coming to a close, it has been noted by some, myself 
included, that Derrida while appearing cryptic in writing, is most 
often very lucid in dialogue. I suggest that Derrida's writings 
utilize a different mode of language than when he is caught up in 
conversation. Like a praise act, one needs a different means of 
analyzing what is being said within his texts. In order to understand 
one must be enraptured in the play of words, in the performance of 
language. If one is looking for the explicit mentioning of the third 
way, then one will not find it. In his response to Marion, Dei-rida, 
very much in line with what was just said, notes, "1 would perhaps 
say that [Marion] gave me too much as to the alleged objections 
to the so-called negative theology, and by giving me too much, T 
am afraid that he did not find enough in my texts on the sub~ie~t."~~ 
As we read, Derrida in Diflmm4e denounces negative theology 
as denying essence or existence to God, only to turn around and 
affirm it. Let us say for the moment that Derrida far from a literal 
reading of his denials is at play within the perfonnative language 
of mystical theology. If mystical theology, taking into account all 
three ways, affirmation, negation, and performance, were to reflect 
back upon itself, would it affirm itself, deny itself, and allow itself 
to be caught up in the performance of words, as Derrida does in 
these passages? I believe it would. This is what Derrida's texts 
do through saying, say through doing. Derrida when speaking of 
religion, or, perhaps, speaking religiously, is not merely interested 
in stating a catalogue of facts about the three ways. He shows 
us something, indicates, points to, and utilizes a wide range of 
language-tools - denials, affirmations, performances. Marion in 
this particular debate wanted to hear Derrida submit his program 
to the "metaphysics of presence" by speaking of or about the third 
way, when Derrida attempts the impossible by performing and 
dancing in language. 
your The words the supplicant speaks are not her words; 
they are God's. God pours the words of God into the chosen vessel 
and through overabundance the words flow out to others. It is this 
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